Liability of Hospitals for the Negligence of Their Employees by Lorber, Harry
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 15 
Number 2 Volume 15, April 1941, Number 2 Article 10 
August 2013 
Liability of Hospitals for the Negligence of Their Employees 
Harry Lorber 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Lorber, Harry (1941) "Liability of Hospitals for the Negligence of Their Employees," St. John's Law Review: 
Vol. 15 : No. 2 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss2/10 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
NQTES AND COMMENT
.ing with them.69 . The. common design has been. to insure, in case of
disaster, uniformity in the treatment of depositors -.and, a. ratable
'distribution of the assets.70
BERNARD SCHIFF.
LIABIILITY OF HOSPITALS FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF THEIR
EMPLOYEES
The cases on the subject of charitable hospital liability "present
an almost hopelessly tangled mass of reason such as is not often
encountered in the law.... The question is one which the courts have
been fertile in drawing subtle distinctions, many of them irrelevant to
,the point for discussion, or, at least, leading to no principle by which
the conclusions reached can be reconciled." I An abundance of opin-
ion reveals a marked dissatisfaction with the status of the law today,
and evidences a positive desire that hospital liability conform to the
changing mores of the times. For the purposes of this article, the
subject of liability will be approached from the various agencies pur-
porting to claim exemptions from tort liability. 'A discussion of the
damage liability of charitable, state and municipal hospitals will be had
in order.
Charitable Hospitals
One of the earliest cases in this country deciding that a charitable
hospital is exempt from tort liability to a patient is that of McDonald
v. Massachusetts General Hospital.2 - In the formation of the immu-
nity rule, this case has been frequently cited and approved.3 In turn,
the only authority relied upon in that case was a decision of an English
court.4 That this 'case was shortly overruled and the subsequent
status of the American decisions impaired is evidenced by the state-
ment of Kennedy, L.J., "With the American ... cases ... I do not
think it necessary to deal. They are not in agreement; in one of them
[citing the McDonald case] the judgment appears to have been influ-
enced by an English decision of Holliday v. St. Leonard, supra, which
has been overruled by the House of Lords in Mersey Docks v.
Gibbs." 
69 People v. Wiersema State Bank, 361 Ill. 75, 197 N. E. 537 (1935).
70 Ibid.
1 Zollman, Damage Liability of Charitable Institutions (1921) 19 Mica. L.
Rnv. 395, 408.
2 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
3 Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915) ; L. P.
A. (1915D).
4 Holliday v. St Leonard, 11 C. B. (N. s.) 192 (1861).
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An examination of the later cases sustaining immunity reveals
that they adopted language imported from some previous case, which
in turn adopted language from still earlier cases. Few courts examine
the question in the light of modern conditions. "There was a certain
amount of 'goose-stepping'." 6 To uphold the doctrine of immunity,
the courts "swung with agility from one theory to another." 7 As
soon as one substantiation proved unsound in reason and law, another
was hurriedly set forth. In succession, the courts initiated the trust
fund theory, .the waiver theory, and the inapplicability of respondeat
superior.8  The first of these doctrines was harbored for a while,9 but
was soon declared unsatisfactory " and repudiated by a number of
American courts.' The waiver theory, too, was discarded as having
no foundation in fact and reason.12 The third approach, that respon-
deat superior does not apply,'3 is the most formidable of the group.
It is of this theory that a learned author has declared: "Here we have
a logical basis for the decision in question." 14 Similarly, this theory
has been followed in the New York cases. 15 The question remains,
however, whether this doctrine is sufficiently founded in fact and rea-
son to support the consequences of its operation; or whether it does
violence to the facts in saying that a charity patient coming to such an
institution for aid, impliedly selects the attendants as his own.16
The rule of exemption from liability arose.when charitable organ-
izations, having their origin in the donations of benevolent persons or
in grants from the state,17 were supported by a few individuals and
their resources were limited.18 It was, therefore, in the best interests
5 Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew's Hospital, 2 K. B. 820, 830 (1909).
6 Wolfe, J. (concurring) in Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital,
94 Utah 460, 78 P. (2d) 645, 654 (1938).7 Note (1938) 12 ST. JoHN's L. REV, 99, 101.
8 Feezer, The Tort Liability of Charities (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 191;(1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1485; Note (1938) 12 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 99.
9 Herriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Clark and F. 507 (1846) (trust assets are
not available for payment of damages-inconsistent with purpose). Powers v.
Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (C. C. A. Mass. 1901); Adams v. Univer-
sity Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W. 453 (1907).
10 Mersey Docks and Harbor Trustees v. Gibbs, L. R. 1 H. L. 93 (1864).
11 Cohen v. General Hospital, 113 Conn. 188, 154 Atl. 435 (1931) ; Kellogg
v. Church Charity Foundation, 128 App. Div. 214, 112 N. Y. Supp. 566 (2d
Dept. 1908); Hospital of St. Vincent v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S. E. 13
(1914).
12 "A patient entirely unskilled in legal principles, his body racked with pain,
his mind distorted with fever, is held to know by intuition, the principle of law
that the courts after years of travail have at last produced." Fraser, J.,
dissenting in Lindler v. Columbia Hospital, 98 S. C. 25, 36, 81 S. E. 512, 515(1914) ; (1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 93.
13 Phillips v. Buffalo General Hosp., 239 N: Y. 188, 146 N. E. 199 (1924).
14 BURDICK, LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1926) 145; Zollman, Daimage Liability
of Charitable Institutions (1921) 19 MicH. L. Rav. 395.
15 Schloendorff v. N. Y. Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914);(1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 93; see note 8, supra.
16 See note 15, supra.
17 Bu uIcK, LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1926) 140.
Is "Tolerance of such liabilities might eventuate in the destruction of the
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of the public that these institutions were nurtured. Today, however,
charity is being dispensed by large, well-endowed corporations, whose
modem multiplication has apparently reduced this danger and ren-
dered more equitable the payment of compensation to those so injured.
Thus the demands of the public welfare, for protection from liabilities
for wrongs committed in their conduct, have become less imperative
as compared with the needs of the injured individual. 19 Their eco-
nomic aspects are non-profit rather than charitable. 20
Most jurisdictions enforce ordinary tort liability against chari-
table organizations where employees 21 or strangers 22 are injured.
As to beneficiaries alone, is such an institution exempt from liability
for injury caused by the negligent acts of its employees in the scope of
their professional employment.23  Coincidently, most of the cases in
which beneficiaries have sued charitable hospitals and been denied'
recovery, are those where the injury was caused by the negligence of
a doctor or nurse. It is at this point -that the inconsistency and con-
fusion of the courts is at its height. A determination of whether the
act is "administrative" or "professional" is sought.24  If the act is
administrative, a recovery is permitted; if professional, no recovery.2 5
It is difficult to reconcile the judicial "juggling" of the doctrine of
respondeat superior. If the doctrine is applicable, should it not be a
determining factor in both cases? Either respondeat superior applies
or it does not. If the charity or other exempted body is immune,
respondeat superior is irrelevant; if not, it can clearly be invoked. If
this theory has any foundation in logic, reason or fact it would be
sufficient to bar recovery in any instance whether the act be admin-
istrative or professional. Can the doctrine be made applicable when
a servant is performing a menial function and then mysteriously dis-
appear when the act is termed "professional". If the 'relationship of
master and servant exists for one purpose, it is a retreat from realism
to say that it is lacking for another purpose. In New York, a mem-
bership corporation may be formed to establish and maintain a hos-
pital. 2 6  "Thus a hospital. duly incorporated under the Membership
Corporations Law undoubtedly holds itself out as being able to diag-
charity and discourage donors to the detriment of the public welfare." Lincoln
Memorial University v. Sutton, 163 Tenn. 298, 43 S. W. (2d) 195, 196 (1931).19 See note 20, infra; Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Couillens, 140 S. W.
(2d) 1088 (Tenn. 1940).
20 Silva v. Providence Hospital, 99 Cal. Dec. 20, 97 P. (2d) 798 (1939).
21 Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N. Y. 233, 92 N. E. 626 (1910).22 Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation, 203 N. Y. 191, 96 N. E. 406
(1911); 7 L. R. A. (x. s.) 481 (1906).
23 D'Amato v. Orange Mem. Hosp., 127 At. 340, 101 N. J. L. 61 (1925)
(not liable for nurse) ; Schloendorff v. Society of N. Y. Hospital, 211 N. Y.
125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914) (not liable for act of doctor or nurse); Phillips v.
Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N. Y. 188, 146 N. E. 199 (1924) (not liable for
act of orderly performing duty of nurse).
24 See note 23, supra.
25 Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N. Y. 188, 146 N. E. 199 (1924).
26 N. Y. MEMBERSHIP CoRP. LAW §§ 4, 40.
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nose, treat, operate and prescribe for human disease." 27 Such -.cdr-
porations do in fact possess legislative sanction to practice medicine
by means of its staff of registered physicians and surgeons. And yet,
when they are engaged in the very purpose for which they are formed,
their servants are, quite paradoxically, construed to be servants of the
beneficiary.28  Obviously the principle of respondeat superior should
apply. "The mistake is that respondeat superior is treated as a doc-
trine as broad in its application as liability itself." In reality, it is a
question to be decided "only after the way-is, clear -to find" 29 the hos-
pital liable for a tort, should the relationship of master and servant be
found to exist. Respondeat superior has been the big stumbling block
in the reported decisions. The chief difficulty has been in determining
whether a given act was professional'or administrative. This in turn
resulted in an anomaly in the law: a relationship of employer and em-
ployee on one hand and its total absence on the other.30 The Supreme
Court of Canada solved this problem most judiciously 81 when it con-
sidered a nurse a servant of the hospital for all purposes regardless
of the nature of the act involved.32 The question seems to be not one
of skill or the nature of the skill required in the performance of a given
act, but rather of the nature of the hospital's duty towards a patient.
If the hospital undertakes to provide certain treatments, there seems
.to be no reason to exonerate it for the negligent acts of persons who
are in their employ and subject to their control.33 Thus the hospital
is not relieved from liability unless it can be clearly shown that the
nurse had passed under the control of some third person,84 and this
regardless of the fact that the act was one requiring -peculiar skill.8 5
It is a well established policy of the law that individuals must be
just before they are generous. This would seem to be equally ap-
plicable to -charitable institutions. "To require an injured individual
to forego compensation for harm when he is otherwise entitled there-
to, because the injury was committed by the servants of a charity, is
27 People v. Woodbury Dermatological Institute, 192 N. Y. 454, 458, 85
N. E. 697, 699 (1908) ; see Post, et al. v. Crown Heights Hospital, Inc., 173
Misc. 250, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 409 (1940).
28 HARPER, LAW oF TORTS (1933) § 293 -("Corporations commit torts by the
same people who effect and consummate their legitimate activities").
29 Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation (1941) 54
HARv. L. REv. 437, 439.30 Note (1938) 16 CAN. BAR REV. 655.
31 Sisters of St. Joseph v. Fleming, 2 D. L. R. 417 (1938).
32 Goodhart, Hospitals and Trained Nurse& (1938) 54 L. Q. REv. 553;
Note (1938) 16 CAN. BAR REv. 566.
33 See note 31, mtpra; Wardell v. Kent County Council, 2 K. B. 768 (1938);
Post, et al. v. Crown Heights Hospital, Inc., 173 Misc. 250, 17 N. Y. S. (2d)
409 (1940).
34 Where the control shifts to that of the operating surgeon, the hospital is
-not liable. Kamps v. Crown Heights Hospital, Inc., 251 App. Div. 849, 296
N. Y. Supp. 776 (2d Dept. 1937); Alderhold v. Bishop, 94 Okla. 203, 221 Pac.
752 (1923) ; Emerson v. Chapman, 138 Okla. 270, 280 Pac. 820 (1929); Peter-
son v. Richards, 73 Utah 59, 272 Pac. 229 (1928).
85 Note (1940) 18 CAN. BAR REv. 776.
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to. require him to make an unreasonable contribution fo 'the. charity,,
against his will, and a rule of law imposing sitch burdens cannot be&
regarded as socially desirable or consistent with sound policy." 4
This view is in accord with the modem trend of decisions holding a
charitable corporation liable quite as though it was operating for a
profit and not different than in the case of any other corporation.
3 7
For no one is obliged by law to assist even a stranger, However,
once he has undertaken to render assistance the law imposes upon him
a duty of care towards the person assisted.38 This situation is iap-
parently -analogous to that of a charitable institution, but the ourts-,
seem determined to draw lines of demarcation. For years, cofirts
have been making inroads upon the rule of non-liability, and have to
some extent whittled away its effectiveness. But recent cases,; recog-
nizing the dubious and fallacious reasoning advanced on behalf of-
the immunity rule have taken the position that the reasohs havifig
disappeared, the rule should fall with, it. "It would be iare indeed-
that any philanthropist would fail to give to a charitable use because,
he'feared that the institution he created' or contributed to might be
sued for negligence, and some of its funds-be required to compensate
for the negligence." He would probably add, "Better justice wiffi the;
funds at home than charity abroad.,'.' , There 'seeris, therefore, to"
be no good reAson why any charity shtxuld be -exempted from tort-
liability under m6der conditions.4" 'If a person' is injured and no;
recoripense is given' from any sour&e, the result is apt to be that a
certain numbef of persons will* become public charges, and 4, feeling
of social injustice will be implanted in the minds- of the victims.41
A desirable solution to the problfni has been reached 4 2 in Colo-
rado 43 and Tennessee,44 whose courts rule that exemption from lia-
bility extends no further than necessary t6' protect: the charitable trust.
from diversiori. Thus a tort judgment may be allowed against the
institution, thotigh only to be satisfied to the extent, of' any insurance,
which will not affect or deplete the trtist property. Legislation should
be invoked to compel all charitable' institutions to carry policies for.
36 HARPER, LAW oF-TORTS (1933) 657; see note 20, supra. -
37 Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n,. 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915);-
Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144, Minn, 392, 175 N. W. 699(1920) ; Sessions" v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital, 94 Utah 460, 78 P.(2d) 645 (1938). "
38 McLeod v. Ransorr, 215 Mass. 257, 102 N . E. 429; Owl Drug Co. v.
Crandall, 80 P. (2d) 952 (Ariz. 1938).
39 Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital, 94 Utah 460, 78 P. (2d)
645, 654 (1938).
40 Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N. Y. 163, 7.N. E.
(2d) 28 (1937); (1937) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 534. Charitable hospitals in
New York will probably be subject to all ordinary rules of vicarious liability;
see note 29, supra.
412 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 401.
42 Note (1941) 21 N. C. L. Rav. 245.
43 O'Connor v. Association, 96 P. (2d) 835 (Colo. 1939).
44 Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W. (2d)
284 (1939) (recovery to extent of liability insurance).
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general indemnity. 45 Such a view is more consonant with progressive
public policy in initiating liability insurance to remove similar dis-
abilities in other fi~lds. 4 6
State Liability in New York
It is axiomatic that a sovereignty cannot be sued unless it con-
sents.47 In New York this accession has been manifested in Section
8 of the Court of Claims Act.48  The state has, by statute, waived
its immunity from liability for the torts of its officers and employees,
and has expressly assumed liability. It was not with little difficulty,
however, that the courts finally applied it to professional employees in
a state hospital. The bugaboo of charitable immunity influenced the
courts even in the face of an express legislative enactment; and when
presented with facts definitely within the purview of the statute, they
proceeded to adjudicate on the rules of charitable hospital immunity.
Recently, however, in an action brought against the state for injuries
sustained in a state hospital, the court took a definite stand.49 The
patient's death was caused by the administration of unneutralized sal-
varsan by persons employed at the hospital, when the treatment pre-
scribed was neo-salvarsan. Notwithstanding the state furnished com-
petent doctors and nurses, the court found that there was negligence
in administering the drug, and allowed recovery. The state relied
on the decision of Schloendorif v. Society of New York Hospitals.0
Held, "Section 12a [now Section 8] of the Court of Claims Act be-
came law in 1921. Prior to that time the State had not waived im-
munity, nor had it assumed liability." The statute "in effect pro-
vides that the doctrine of respondeat superibr does apply to the State.
Hence the cases cited by the State are no longer authority under the
set of facts in this case." "I This decision is in harmony with the
declared public policy of the state that persons damaged by the torts
of those acting as its officers and employees need not contribute their
losses to the purposes of government. "We think it would not be a
harmonious policy that would require this plaintiff to put up
45 3 ScoTr, TRUSTS (1939) § 402 ,("A policy, of general indemnity might be
interpreted as to save harmless from such claims as could be enforced against it
if it were not a charitable institution").
46 See note 42, supra. Workmen's Compensation Unemployment Insurance
and contemplated automobile liability insurance.
47 EDGAR AND EDGAR, LAW oF TORTS (2d ed. 1936) § 23.
48 N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 860.
49 Liubowsky v. State, 260 App. Div. 416, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 633 (3d Dept.
1941).
50 See note 23, supra.
51 Liubowsky v. State, 260 App. Div. 416, 418, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 633, 635(3d Dept. 1940). The dissent follows the immunity rule. Gaccione v. State,
173 Misc. 367, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 161 (1940) (state held liable for failure to
safeguard inmate).
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with her injuries on the score that the appellant is a charitable
corporation." 52
Municipal Liability
The doctrine of municipal immunity from tort had an inaus-
picious beginning in 1798.53 It was then expressed that if tort ac-
tions were permitted the public would suffer a great inconvenience.
On this account, it was considered more equitable that the injured
individual should 'suffer, rather than incommode the entire public.
This reason smacks of the fallacious and dubious arguments used in
support of charity immunity, but its acceptance into the law is un-
questioned.
Authorities are agreed that caring for the poor, sick and injured
is essentially a public duty with which the state is primarily charged.5 4
To the extent that a local or municipal corporation exercises this
function, it partakes of the state's prerogative and is exempt from
liability for negligence.55 This doctrine, though widely adhered to,
has been severely criticized. 56 In fact, the legislature has in many
instances abrogated the common law rule and imposed liability on
the city for the governmental acts of its agents.57  In the absence of
statute, too, we find the courts adjudicating with a view to further
limit the non-liability rule and impose liability as justice demands it.
A series of recent decisions exemplify this liberal trend and point out
that the courts are no longer desirous of sustaining the contention that
the city was exercising a sovereign governmental power.5 8 In Volk
v. City of New York,5 9 the plaintiff became ill from an injection of a
52 Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N. Y. 163, 166,
7 N. E. (2d) 28 (1937) ; 109 A. L. R. 1197 (1937). As to private hospitals seeHendrickson v. Hodkin, 276 N. Y. 252 (1937) ; Post, et al. v. Crown Heights
Hospital, Inc., 173 Misc. 250, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 409 (1940).
53 Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 Term Rep. 607 (1798) ; (1932) 1 BROOKLYx
L. REv. 85.
54 1 SHEARMAN AND REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE (5th ed. 1898) 266.55 Maximilian v. New York, 62 N. Y. 160 (1875) ; Danaher v. Brooklyn,
119 N. Y. 241, 23 N. E. 745 (1890) ; see noie 54, supra, § 253; see PRASHICER,
CASES ON LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1927) 200; 2 DILoN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS (1890) 1200; WHITE, NEGLIGENCE OF MUNICIPAL CORPORAIONS(1920).
56 Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort (1928) 28 COL. L. REv.735; Tooke, The Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort (1932) 19 VA. L.
REv. 97; see note 29, supra.
57 Note (1940) 26 CORNE.L L. Q. 145; Derlicka v. Leo, 281 N. Y. 266,22 N. E. (2d) 367 (1939); N. Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 50(a), (b), (c), (d)
(L. 1937).
SO Engels v. City of New York, 281 N. Y. 650, 22 N. E. (2d) 481 (1940);Nathanson v. City of New York, 282 N. Y. 556, 24 N. E. (2d) 983 (1939)(noted in (1940) 9 BRooxLYrN L. Rxv. 341) ; Duren v. City of Binghamton, 283N. Y. 467, 28 N. E. (2d) 979 (1940) (the court assumed that the city was
exercising a governmental function).
59 284 N. Y. 279, 30 N. E. (2d) 596 (1940).
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decomposed morphine ,solution. -The, court allowed recovery even
though both the negligence of the city and of the admirnistering nurses
contributed to the injury; "the defendant was negligent in the per-
formance of an administrative duty in failing to have available for
the nurses a fresh morphine solution." 60 - In this connection it is
interesting to note a recent legislative mandate as regards the mal-
practice of a physician in a city .hospital.01 . "Every municipal cor-
poratioi . . . shall assume the liability, to the extent that it shall
save him harmless, of any physician .-. . rendering medical services
gratuitously 'to a person in a public institution maintained in
whole or in part by the municipal corporation, for damages for per-
sonal injuries..'. sustained... by reason of th-e malpractice of suh
physician . .'." 62 Under this sectiofi,. a new remedy against " th'e
municipality is created in favor of injured persons. The common
law liability against the physician exists, but he has. a 'right to -insist
that in" accord with the statute, he be -saved harmless.6
Conclusion. 
..
Public policy is sometimes found to exist from the fact that. the
legislature has spoken frequently and, consistently.,on a ,subject and'
thus assumed 4 fixed position with. reference thereto. 64 In New York
the adoption. of numerou. statutes waiving, immunity constitute a
recognition and acknowledgmeut. of a moral duty demanded by prin-
ciples of equity and justice.P5-.:. It, declares, that no longer will the
state, use the "mantle of sovereignty" to. protect itself.from such con-
sequences as follow the negligent act. of its employees. 'Similarly,
there seems, to be no good reason why, under modem conditions, any
charity should be exempted .from tort liability. 6  Therefore- it is
submitted: ..
(1) That there is no-basis in fact-or ieason fqr-exempting a
charitable 'institution from"the doctrine" of espondedt 'superior.. If
there be any need for protecting a charitable trust,,from diversion,
the legislature should compel such organizations to carry gene~il pol-
icies of indemnity. This 'vould serve both to make for'consistent
deter iinati6ns, and ayard compensatio' in the best interests of ';us-'
tice and equity.
60 Id. at 286, 30 N. E. (2d) 596. ...6
' N. Y. GEN. Muw. ,LAW § 50d (L. 1937, c. 483).' ' ,"
62 See note 61, supra.
63 Derlicka v. Leo, 281 N. Y. 266, 22 N. E. (2d) 367 (1939), rev'g, 256
App. Div. 215, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 463 (1st Dept. 1939).
64 Campbell v. City of New York, 244 N. Y. 317, 324, 155 N. E. .628 (1927).65 Jackson v. State, 261 N. Y. 134, 184 N. E. 735z. (1933)..
6 Hansen, Damage'Liability of Charitable Corporations (1935) 19 MARQ.
L. REv. 92; Feezer, The Tort Liability of Charities (1928) 77 U. oF PA. L.
Rnv. 191.
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(2) That Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act-has transformed
an unenforceable obligation into an actionable right and applies :the
rule of respondeat superior to the state.
(3) That insofar as some courts have been lax in extending Sec-
tion 8 to include p6litical subdivisions of the state, as was obviously
intended by its general language, the statute be amended to bring
these local bodies within its purview.
It is only by express legislative enactment that we can hope to
align the mass of confusing decisions on the subject of charitable,
state and municipal hospital liability.
HARRY LORBER.
CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 29 OF THE
NEW YORK WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
Introduction
When the New York Workmen's Compensation Law first be-
came effective,' the remedy of the employee injured in the course of
certain specified employments 2 was exclusively in compensation, un-
less the injury resulted proximately from the tortious act of a third
person,3 " or unless the employer failed to' provide compensation in-
surance as required by the law.4 Where the employee was injured
by the negligence or wrong of a third person, Section 29 provided
that he could claim compensation or pursue his common law remedy
against the tort feasor.5 He could not do both, except to the extent
I The Workmen's Compensation Law was enacted by N. Y. Laws 1913,
c. 816 (eff. Dec. 16, 1913) as Chapter 67 of the Consolidated Laws. Constitu-
tional authorization to enact this law (N. Y. CNsT. Art. I, § 19) was not given
to the legislature until Jan. 1, 1914. To assure the constitutionality of the
statute the legislature reenacted it by N. Y. Laws 1914, c. 41. A previous
attempt to enact a workmen's compensation law was made by the legislature by
N. Y. Laws 1910, c. 647, but it was declared unconstitutional in Ives v. South
Buffalo R. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431 (1911).
2 The law covers certain hazardous employments, and all employments,
with certain exceptions, in which four or more operatives are engaged. N. Y.
WORK. Comrn. LAW § 3.
3 Prior to N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 695, a co-employee was a "third person";
Judson v. Fielding, 227 App. Div. 430, 237 N. Y. Supp. 348 (3d Dept. 1929);
Shelter v. Grobsmith, 143 Misc. 380, 257 N. Y. Supp. 353 (1932).4 N. Y. WORK. Comp. LAW § 11; N. Y. WORK. ComP. LAW § 52 (the
employer's failure to comply with the Act is a misdemeanor).
Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Brass Goods Mfg. Co., 239 N. Y. 273, 146 N. E.
377 (1925); Schubert v. Finkelstein, 244 N. Y. 483, 155 N. E. 906 (1927);
Miller v. New York Rys., 171 App. Div. 316, 157 N. Y. Supp. 200 (2d Dept.
1916) ; Roecklein v. American Sugar Refining Co., 222 App. Div. 540, 226 N. Y.
Supp. 375 (2d Dept. 1928) ; Sabatino v. Crimmins, 102 Misc. 172, 168 N. Y.
'283
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